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Widening the Wage Gap:
The Skill Premium and Technology
orkers who acquire more skills and more
knowledge typically earn a higher wage than
those who don’t. Economists call this
difference in wages between high-skill and
low-skill workers the skill premium. Over the past 30
years, the skill premium has increased dramatically.
Although economists are still debating the causes of this
increase, it seems likely that skill-biased technical change
has played a large role. As companies have invested in
new technologies, demand for workers who can use them
has surged. Keith Sill reviews the literature and tells us
why some theories fall flat and why technology seems to
be the key to the widening wage gap.
Keith Sill




Data on earnings and wages
show that workers receive a monetary
reward for attaining high levels of skills
and that this reward has been increasing
over time. In fact, over the past 30 years,
the wages paid to the most highly skilled
workers — those who have higher levels
of education, ability, or job training —
have increased dramatically relative to
the wages of the least skilled workers.
This difference in wages between
skilled and unskilled workers is called
the skill premium.
Workers have responded to
these monetary incentives by acquiring
more skills through schooling. From the
1970s to the mid-1990s, the number of
college-educated workers in the United
States almost doubled, and they now
represent a much larger share of the
workforce. If we equate skill with
college education, the supply of skilled
workers was increasing dramatically at
the same time that the skill premium
was rising. We might think that a greater
supply of skilled workers would lower
wages for those workers, thereby
lowering the return to acquiring skills
and the skill premium. But since the
supply of skilled workers increased
dramatically at the same time that the
skill premium increased — and supply
increased even more rapidly in the 1980s
— demand for skilled workers must also
have increased.
In this article, I will examine
theories and evidence that shed light on
the dramatic increase in the skill
premium over the past three decades.
Explanations that have been proposed to
account for the increase include the
decline in the fraction of the labor force
that is unionized and increased wage
competition from unskilled workers in
less developed countries. However, these
theories are unable to explain important
facts about the skill premium. Rather,
the increased relative wage paid to
skilled workers appears to be linked to
new technologies that firms are using
and to investments that firms are
making in new equipment that
embodies new technologies. For firms to
take full advantage of this new equip-
ment, they need high-skill workers to
design, install, operate, and maintain it.
At the same time, this new equipment
often performs tasks that unskilled
workers used to perform. As the
economy has become more knowledge
based, the demand for skilled workers
has surged.
ESTIMATING SUPPLY
We can roughly estimate the
supply of skilled workers by examining
educational attainment. Generally, we
consider workers with a college degree
to be skilled and those with no college
education to be unskilled. To account
for workers who have some college
education but no degree, we divide
those workers evenly between skilled
and unskilled workers. This measure of
skilled workers is called college-equiva-
lent workers. The relative supply of
skilled (that is, college-equivalent)
workers rose from 17 percent of the labor26   Q4  2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
force in 1960 to about 43 percent in
1996 (Figure 1). There was slightly
faster growth in the supply of college-
equivalent workers in the 1970s.
MEASURING THE RETURN TO
ACQUIRING SKILLS
There are several ways to
measure the extent to which the
disparity in wages between skilled and
unskilled workers has been increasing in
the U.S. economy. Often, analysts focus
on the average wages of skilled workers
and compare them to the average
wages of unskilled workers.  The higher
the disparity in wages between skilled
and unskilled workers, the higher is the
skill premium.
Returns to Education. A
higher level of education is one way
that workers can upgrade their skills
and increase their wages. Thus, we can
examine how the return on earnings
from acquiring more education has
changed over time, since, generally, the
return to years of schooling tracks
changes in the wage structure. For
example, we can study how earnings
tend to increase after a worker spends
another year in college. A 1999 paper by
Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz
examined the returns to education for
U.S. workers.  The return to education
is measured as the percent increase in
wages, calculated at an annual rate,
that workers with more education get
compared with workers with less
education. Goldin and Katz found that
the return to a year of college education
for young men fell slightly, from 9.6
percent in 1969 to 8.4 percent in 1979,
then shot up to 13.3 percent in 1995.1
Thus, workers who acquire more
education and improve their skills
receive a greater return from that
education today than they did in the
1960s. This suggests that earnings
inequality between high-education and
low-education workers has risen
compared with what it was in 1969.
Data for 1999 show that having more
education tends to pay off: The average
earnings of high-school-educated
workers were $24,572, compared with
average earnings of $45,678 for college-
educated-workers and $67,697 for
workers with advanced degrees.2
We can also directly compare
the wages of workers who went to
college and those who did not. The
average wage of a college-educated
worker was about 59 percent higher
than that of a high-school-educated
worker in 1970 and about 75 percent
higher in 1996. The skill premium began
to rise dramatically beginning around
1980 (Figure 2).3 More recent data
suggest that the skill premium contin-
ued to rise from the mid-1990s through
2000.4
Distribution of Wages. Other
measures of wage disparity tell a similar
story. We can summarize wage disparity
by examining the distribution of wages
across workers, which shows the
frequency with which wages of a
FIGURE 1
Supply of Skilled Workers
* Supply of college-equivalent workers as a fraction of the labor force.  College
equivalent workers are defined as workers with a college degree plus 50 percent of
workers with some college education.  Data taken from Table 1 in David H. Autor,
Lawrence F. Katz, and Alan B. Krueger, “Computing Inequality: Have Computers
Changed the Labor Market?”  The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113:4 (November
1998), pp. 1169-1213.  © 1999 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Used with permission.












1 The return to a year of college is defined as
the natural log of the ratio of mean wages for
those with exactly 16 years of schooling and
those with exactly 12 years of schooling
divided by 4.  The wage data were adjusted
for workers’ experience and geographic
differences.  See Goldin and Katz’s 1999 paper
for details.
2 For more on recent trends in the dispersion
of wages, see the article by Bharat Trehan.
3 These numbers are based on those in the
paper by David Autor, Lawrence Katz, and
Alan Krueger.  They report that the natural
log of the ratio of a weighted average of
college and post-college wages to high-school
wages was 0.465 in 1970 and 0.557 in 1996.
4 See the paper by Paul Beaudry and David
Green.
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FIGURE 2
College Skill Premium*
* Log relative wage of college plus post-college workers to high-school workers.  Last
point plotted is for 1996.  Data from Autor, Katz, and Krueger.
FIGURE 3
Indexed Wages for White Males 1963-1997*
*Changes in the indexed value of the 90th, 50th, and 10th percentiles of the wage
distribution for white males (1963 values normalized to 100).  Data from March CPSs.
Figure taken from Daron Acemoglu, “Technical Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market,”
Journal of Economic Literature, 40, 1, 2002 (Figure 2). Used with permission.
certain level are likely to occur in the
population of workers. For example, we
would expect to find relatively few
workers who make over $200,000 a year,
but many more workers who make
around $40,000 a year.  We can then use
this distribution to examine how the
wages of the richest and poorest workers
change over time. In fact, the wage
differential between workers whose
earnings are in the top 10 percent of the
wage distribution (the richest workers)
and workers whose earnings are in the
bottom 10 percent of the wage distribu-
tion (the poorest workers) has increased
dramatically since the 1970s. So has the
wage differential between the average
worker (50th percentile) and workers in
the lowest 10th of the distribution. Wages
of high-earning white males and low-
earning white males rose in tandem
during the 1960s (Figure 3).5 Beginning
in the 1970s, wages began to diverge. By
1995, top earners’ wages were about 40
percent higher than they were in the
early 1960s (that is, the index rose to
140), while earners at the bottom of the
distribution saw real wages fall 10
percent (the index fell to 90). Workers
in the middle of the distribution fared
somewhat better than those at the
bottom: The average worker saw his
wage rise about 15 percent from the
early 1960s until 1995.
EXPLAINING THE INCREASE IN
THE SKILL PREMIUM
The rise in the skill premium
could be due to rising wages for skilled
workers or falling wages for unskilled
workers, or both.  The data show that
the real wages (wages adjusted for
inflation) of skilled workers generally
have risen since the mid-1970s. How-
ever, the real wages of unskilled workers
5 We look at white males to control for
changes in demographics over time, such as
the increasing share of women in the labor
force. A change in the index represents a
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fell from the mid-1970s to the early
1990s, then began to rebound. Thus,
part of the story for the rise in the skill
premium since the 1970s is that real
wages for unskilled workers fell over
much of the period.
Several theories have been
proposed to account for the increase in
the skill premium in the United States.
Globalization. One commonly
proposed explanation highlights
globalization and increased trade with
less developed countries.  In less
developed countries, low-skill workers
are more abundant than high-skill
workers because workers in poor
countries tend to have less training and
education and to work in industries not
as technically advanced as those in
developed countries. When the U.S.
increases its trade of goods and services
with less developed countries, the low-
skill workers in poor countries put
downward pressure on the wages of low-
skill workers in the U.S., since the two
sets of workers often produce compa-
rable items. Similarly, the goods that
high-skill workers produce in the U.S.
are scarce in less developed countries.
So when less developed countries import
more of those goods, demand increases,
and there is upward pressure on the
wages of high-skill workers in the U.S.
Empirical support for the
globalization theory is weak, though. For
the U.S., trade with less developed
countries represents, at most, 2 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP).
Because it contributes such a small part
to U.S. GDP , trade with less developed
countries is unlikely to be driving the
trend in the skill premium. Furthermore,
the trade-liberalization story implies that
the prices of less skill-intensive goods in
the U.S. economy should fall relative to
the prices of more skill-intensive goods
because the U.S. would import the
goods produced by low-skill foreign labor
and export goods produced by high-skill
U.S. labor. But the data contain little
evidence for this price behavior.
If trade were the main force
behind the rise in the skill premium, we
would find that increased production of
skill-intensive goods (to meet increased
demand for these goods from foreign
countries) would be drawing workers
away from other sectors of the economy.
However, some studies have indicated
that all sectors, even those that produce
less skill-intensive goods, have increased
their demand for skilled workers, that is,
production of many goods is becoming
more skill-intensive.6 Thus, we do not
see the across-industry shift in employ-
ment implied by the trade story.
Decline in Unionization.
Another theory that has been proposed
to explain the rise in the U.S. skill
premium is that the fraction of the
workforce that is unionized has been
declining for some time. Union con-
tracts tend to be written in such a way
that the difference in wages between
the highest and lowest paid workers is
less than what it would be if there were
no unionization. For example, some
union contracts may tie salary increases
more to tenure on the job than to merit.
Unions had set wages for many
occupations in the postwar U.S.
However, the fraction of the civilian
labor force that is unionized peaked at
about 25 percent around 1970, then fell
to about 13 percent in the early 1990s.
Could this decline in unionization have
contributed significantly to the increase
in wage inequality? The theory that the
decline in unionization has caused
increased wage inequality is the subject
of much research.7
In the United States, the big
decline in unionization came during the
1980s, after the defeat of the air-traffic
controllers’ strike. This large drop in
unionization occurred after the rapid
increase in the skill premium in the
1960s. Note, though, that the decline in
unionization does coincide with the
drop in wages of unskilled workers, and
so it may be a contributing factor in the
rise in the skill premium. One difficulty
with the unionization theory is that
wage inequality (the difference
between the highest paid workers and
the lowest paid workers) has also
increased in many professions, such as
medicine and law, that are not generally
unionized. Evidence from other
countries, such as the United Kingdom
and Canada, also shows little correlation
between the extent of unionization and
trends in wage inequality. Thus, while
the decline in unionization may have
been a contributing factor to the
increase in the skill premium in the U.S.,
it does not appear to be a primary
explanation.8
Advances in Technology.
The most promising theory to account
for the rise in the skill premium ties the
6 See the article by Berman, Bound, and
Griliches and the one by Autor, Katz, and
Krueger.
7 A readable discussion of such research is
Martin Asher and Robert DeFina’s 1995
Business Review article.
8 Another potential explanation for the rise in
the skill premium and the fall in wages of low-
skill workers is immigration. Immigrants have
tended to be low-skill workers; thus, an influx
of these workers may have depressed wages of
other low-skill workers. However, empirically,
immigration’s effect on the skill premium
appears to be small. See the paper by George
Borjas, Richard Freeman, and Lawrence Katz.
The rise in the skill premium could be due to
rising wages for skilled workers or falling
wages for unskilled workers, or both.  Business Review  Q4  2002   29 www.phil.frb.org
change in wages to the advancement of
technology. When advances in technol-
ogy increase demand for skilled workers
more than demand for unskilled
workers, economists say that technical
change is skill-biased.
New technologies are con-
stantly being developed, and firms have
been investing heavily in equipment
that uses these new technologies. The
new high-tech equipment, such as
computer-controlled machines,
industrial robots, and flexible manufac-
turing systems, performs more efficiently
in the hands of skilled workers. As this
advanced technology becomes more
common in the workplace, it tends to
replace unskilled workers; at the same
time, it requires additional skilled
workers to operate it.
Directly measuring the
amount of technological progress in the
U.S. economy is difficult.  Indirect
measures, such as the amount of
spending on research and development
and the amount of spending on
computers, are available. A 1994 study
by Eli Berman, John Bound, and Zvi
Griliches found that spending on
research and development and comput-
ers accounts for about 70 percent of the
shift of the manufacturing labor force
from production workers to nonproduc-
tion workers from 1979 to 1987.
Conceptually, production workers are
typically associated with “blue-collar”
jobs and nonproduction workers with
“white-collar” jobs.9 In addition, the
classification of workers into blue-collar
and white-collar jobs closely reflects
their classification into those with a
high-school education and those with a
college education. Hence, the shift from
production workers to nonproduction
workers indicates a shift from low-skill to
high-skill workers. By this measure,
spending on new technologies has
helped boost demand for skilled
workers.
Other studies have found that
the share of college-educated workers
has increased substantially in all sectors
of the economy since the mid-1970s. 10
The demand for skilled workers must
have been increasing even faster than
the supply, however, since the skill
premium has been rising.
The data suggest that new
technologies, new capital (machines),
and skilled labor go together and that
new machines are more likely to replace
unskilled workers.  As firms invest in
new technologies, the demand for
skilled workers increases relative to the
demand for unskilled workers, and the
relative wage paid to skilled workers
rises.
Remember, though, that not
only have the wages of skilled workers
increased, but also those of unskilled
workers have decreased. Can techno-
logical change lead to lower wages for
unskilled workers at the same time that
it increases wages for skilled workers?
Under certain conditions, the answer is
yes.  Suppose there are two production
sectors in the economy: One sector uses
capital and skilled workers to produce
goods, and the other uses capital and
unskilled workers. A new technology
that works well with skilled labor might
induce a flow of capital from the sector
with unskilled workers to the one with
skilled workers in order to take advan-
tage of skilled workers’ increased
productivity. As capital flows out of the
unskilled sector, workers in that sector
will have less capital to work with,
making them less productive and
leading to a decline in wages paid to
unskilled workers. Hence, technical
change that favors skilled workers could
lead to a drop in the wages of unskilled
workers and a simultaneous rise in the
wages of skilled workers.11
THE SKILL PREMIUM SURGED
IN THE 1980s
If changes in technology
explain the increase in the skill pre-
mium, the next question is: Did changes
in technology accelerate in the 1980s
and lead to a surge in the skill premium
in that decade?
Historical studies have found
that skill-biased technical change was
prevalent throughout the 20th century.
For the most part, new technologies that
were introduced in the 20th century
tended to replace unskilled workers and
favored the use of skilled workers. In
their 1998 article, Claudia Goldin and
9 The paper by Berman, Bound, and Griliches
uses the Annual Survey of Manufactures’
definition of production workers: “workers (up
through the working foreman level) engaged
in fabricating, processing, assembling,
inspecting, and other manufacturing.”
Nonproduction workers are “personnel,
including those engaged in supervision (above
the working foreman level), installation and
servicing of own product, sales, delivery,
professional, technological, administrative,
etc.”
For the most part,
new technologies that
were introduced in the
20th century tended to
replace unskilled
workers and favored
the use of skilled
workers.
10 Berman, Bound, and Griliches found that
the shift of workers from production tasks to
nonproduction tasks is happening within
industries. Thus, many industries increased
their demand for skilled workers as a result of
advancements in technology; it is not the
case that the main driver has been a shift
from low-tech to high-tech industries. Autor,
Katz, and Krueger’s research also confirms
this finding. 11 See the paper by Beaudry and Green.30   Q4  2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
Lawrence Katz argue that new manu-
facturing technologies that replaced
unskilled workers and increased the
demand for skilled workers became
prevalent with the introduction of batch
and continuous-process methods of
production in the early 20th century.12
Similarly, the switch from steam and
water power to electrical power reduced
the demand for unskilled workers in
many transportation and assembly tasks.
More recent examples of new technolo-
gies that have replaced unskilled labor
include robotic assembly operations and
programmable machine tools.
But if skill-biased technical
change was occurring throughout the
20th century, potentially raising the
relative wages of skilled workers versus
those of unskilled workers, how do we
account for the dramatic increase in
wage inequality over the past 20 years?
Figure 2 shows that the rise in the skill
premium was particularly large in the
1980s. Why?
Accelerating Demand. Did
skill-biased technical change accelerate
in the 1980s and boost demand for
skilled workers? Several pieces of
indirect evidence suggest this may be
the case.  Studies have found that
almost all industries began to employ
more educated workers in the 1970s and
1980s. Furthermore, industries that used
computers more intensively experienced
more rapid upgrading in the skills of
their workforces.13 However, it is not
clear that advances in computers and
information technology increased the
demand for skilled workers more rapidly
than other new technologies did in the
1950s and 1960s.  In other words, we
cannot conclude just by looking at
patterns of computer use that demand
for skilled workers has accelerated.
Autor, Katz, and Krueger
provided evidence in support of an
accelerating demand for skilled workers.
They compared data on the skill
premium and the supply of skilled
workers during two periods: 1940 to
1970 and 1970 to 1995. The period from
1940 to 1970 was characterized by slow
growth of both the skilled labor supply
and the skill premium. From 1970 to
1995, both the supply of skilled workers
and the skill premium grew rapidly. If
demand for skilled workers had not
accelerated, we would expect the skill
premium to have grown more slowly
from 1970 to 1995 than over the earlier
period, since the supply of skilled
workers was growing faster in the later
period.
Other evidence is consistent
with the view that skill-biased technical
change has accelerated. The data
suggest that new capital equipment has
become cheaper. This new equipment
often replaces unskilled workers because
it can perform tasks they previously did.
In addition, adding new capital
equipment to the workplace means that
firms must hire skilled workers to use,
operate, and maintain it. As the price of
new capital equipment falls, firms
acquire relatively more of it, boosting
demand for skilled labor and decreasing
demand for unskilled labor. Data on the
price of new equipment suggest that the
decline in price accelerated at the
beginning of the 1970s.14  Hence, the
demand for skilled workers may have
accelerated as firms responded to the
price incentive to invest more in new
capital equipment.15
Total Factor Productivity.
One caveat in tying the rise in the skill
premium to advances in technology and
the associated investment in high-tech
goods is the behavior of measured
technological progress.  Has technology
advanced at a more rapid pace since the
1970s? A broad measure of technical
change is total factor productivity (TFP)
growth. TFP growth, growth in capital
stock, and growth in total hours worked
in production are combined to deter-
mine output growth, and TFP is the part
of output growth unexplained by growth
in capital stock and the labor force. In
the data, though, measured TFP growth
did not surge upward during the period
in which the skill premium shot up,
casting some doubt on the view that
technical progress has accelerated since
the 1970s.16
12 Batch processes are used for processing
liquid and gaseous materials such as
chemicals, wood pulp, and dairy products.
Continuous-process methods are used for
products that require little assembly and have
few moving parts such as canned foods, soap,
and cigarettes. See Goldin and Katz 1998.
13 See the paper by Autor, Katz, and Krueger.
We cannot conclude just by looking at patterns
of computer use that demand for skilled
workers has accelerated.
14 See the article by Per Krusell, Lee Ohanian,
Victor Rios-Rull, and Giovanni Violante.
15 There are reasons to be cautious about this
story of more rapid investment. It is very hard
to accurately measure the price of equipment
that is undergoing rapid technological
advance.  Take the case of computers. The
change in the quality of computers over time
makes it difficult to quantify exactly how
much cheaper computers are today than they
were in the past. Difficulties in consistently
measuring the price of new equipment over
time make it harder to be confident that the
decline in the relative price of new equipment
accelerated in the 1970s, thus increasing
investment.  It certainly does seem plausible,
though.
16 For more information about TFP , see the
article by Satyajit Chatterjee.  Business Review  Q4  2002   31 www.phil.frb.org
Is the lack of evidence for
faster TFP growth a nail in the coffin for
technology-driven gains in the skill
premium? Possibly not, given that true
TFP growth is hard to measure. One
consequence of rapid technological
advance is that prices may be hard to
measure accurately over time. And
those difficulties may increase over time
as technology grabs an increasingly
larger share of the economy. If price
inflation is overstated, measured real
output growth and measured TFP
growth will be understated. Thus, the
lack of evidence for faster TFP growth
since the 1970s may be a result of the






mentioned above, the weight of the
evidence seems to suggest that skill-
biased technical change accelerated
during the 1980s for the U.S. economy.
Why? Several theories have been put
forward.  One possibility, explored in a
1998 article by Daron Acemoglu, is that
designers and implementers of new
technologies, such as scientists and
engineers, recognized that the relative
supply of skilled workers had increased,
then developed technologies that took
advantage of the increasingly skilled
workforce. Perhaps engineers specifically
designed new machines in a way that
could better use the abilities of skilled
workers. Economists call this theory
directed technical change. An attractive
feature of this story is that it gets the
timing right between the increase in the
number of skilled workers and the
increase in the skill premium — they
showed faster growth at about the same
time.
However, we should be
cautious in using the theory of directed
technical change to interpret the recent
facts because another important episode
in U.S. history seems to contradict the
theory’s predictions. During the 1940s,
there was a surge in the supply of high-
school-educated workers, who were the
skilled workers of that time. But the
data show no dramatic increase in the
wages paid to high-school-educated
workers in the 1940s.18 Why didn’t the
engineers of the 1940s design new
equipment that used the relatively
abundant supply of skilled workers and
thus increase demand for skilled
workers more than enough to offset the
increase in supply?
Another story that potentially
explains the acceleration of skill-biased
technical change is related to the
computer and communications
revolution and the extent to which it
has affected many different sectors of
the economy.  The computer and
communications revolution that began
in the 1970s may be an example of what
economists call a general purpose
technology (GPT). A GPT is an
innovation that has the potential to
become widely used across many sectors
of the economy and that drastically
changes the way businesses and
factories in the affected sectors carry out
their operations. GPTs may be slow to
diffuse through the economy, but they
eventually lead to an increase in worker
productivity. Early examples of GPTs
include the invention of writing,
typesetting, and printing, and the
development of electric motors.
If the computer and communi-
cations revolution is an example of GPT
that slowly diffused through the
economy, could it explain the accelera-
tion of skill-biased technical change and
the effect of that acceleration on wages?
It is likely that it takes time for firms and
workers to learn to use new technologies
in the most efficient manner. When
computers and new software were first
introduced, there was a steep learning
curve as workers learned to use them
effectively. Measured productivity may
have declined as workers learned
because time was allocated away from
directly productive tasks and into
learning the new technology. Once
firms and their workers became
comfortable with the new technology
and discovered effective ways to use it
in production, productivity growth
began to increase. At the same time, the
demand for workers who could use the
new technology rose. If demand
accelerated more than supply, the skill
premium paid to high-skill workers
would have tended to rise.19
CONCLUSION
Which of these stories —
directed technical change or GPT or
perhaps an entirely different one — best
fits the facts remains an open question. 17 An in-depth discussion of many of the
issues surrounding these measurement
difficulties and their implications for
economic growth can be found in the 1997
Business Review article by Leonard Nakamura.
19 See the article by Philippe Aghion. 18 See the 1999 paper by Goldin and Katz.
The weight of the evidence seems to suggest
that skill-biased technical change accelerated
during the 1980s for the U.S. economy.32   Q4  2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
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